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Abstract 
This paper reports findings from a survey designed to estimate the numbers 
excluded from employment protection in the UK by the ‘employee’ test and to 
examine, through qualitative research, perceptions of the process of 
employment contracting.  The survey evidence shows that approaching one 
third of the labour force does not fit neatly into the categories of ‘employee’ and 
‘self-employed’.  The case studies suggest that there is a considerable 
disjuncture between the assumptions of choice, control and risk that underlie the 
legal tests, and the perception of these issues by workers whose employment 
status is most in doubt. 
 
 








A version of this paper was presented to a symposium on Commercial Law and 
Commercial Practice at the LSE on 30 November 2002.  I am grateful for the 
comments received from participants in the symposium, in particular Sue 
Ashtiany.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare prevailing judicial interpretations of 
employment contracts with those of employers and workers.  It focuses on a 
central issue in contemporary employment law, namely the construction of 
contractual documents and working arrangements for the purposes of 
determining whether an individual worker is an employee or self-employed.   
Juridical analysis turns, formally, on the test of ‘mutuality of obligation’: do the 
parties to the contract make mutual commitments to make work available (on 
the part of the employer) and to be available for work (on the part of the 
employee)?  On the face of it, this is an approach to construction which is based 
on principles of general contract law and, as such, relatively uncontroversial.  
However, we do not have to dig far below the surface of the mutuality test to 
see that the test is founded on assumptions about choice, control and risk: 
choice, because the content of the legal relationship is assumed to have been 
determined by the free will of the individuals concerned; control, because the 
courts continue to understand the essence of the personal employment 
relationship in terms of the employer’s power to direct the employee; and risk, 
because the parties’ choice of employment arrangement is seen to embody a 
particular combination of protections and liabilities.  These assumptions are 
deeply rooted in juridical discourse and can be traced back to earlier tests used 
by the courts to define employment status. 
 
Recent empirical research in which the author was involved provides an 
opportunity to compare the prevailing juridical view of employment with the 
perceptions of employers and workers.  Research was carried out for the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 1998-99 on how far the current tests of 
employment status were creating uncertainty in practice.
1  This took the form of 
a large-scale survey designed to estimate the numbers potentially excluded from 
certain forms of employment protection, and case studies of the current practice 
of employment contracting.  The evidence collected included standard-form 
employment agreements and accounts by workers of their experience of casual 
and flexible forms of work.  Two conclusions stand out from this research.   
Firstly, on the basis of survey evidence, there is a large proportion of the labour 
force that does not fit neatly into the two categories of ‘employed’ and 
‘self-employed’ which the law uses to classify work relationships.  Secondly, 
the case studies suggest that there is a considerable disjuncture between the 
assumptions of choice, control and risk which underlie the legal tests, and the 
perception of these issues by workers whose employment status is most in 
doubt. 
    2
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 below discusses the legal tests 
used to determine employment status and the role within them of contractual 
interpretation.  Section 3 outlines the relevant empirical evidence.  Section 4 
argues, on the basis of the previous two sections, that the law is currently 
operating dysfunctionally, and considers two possible reforms aimed at 
enhancing its effectiveness: the use of a different definitional test, based on the 
‘worker’ notion, and the application to standard-form employment contracts of 
the techniques of legal regulation adopted in consumer contracts.  It concludes 
that while each of these may prove useful in practice there is a danger that, 
notwithstanding statutory reform, the assumptions underlying the courts’ current 
approach to interpretation are likely to reappear in a new guise. 
 
2.  The role of contractual interpretation in determining employment status 
and statutory employment rights 
 
2.1 The mutuality test 
 
Currently, most rights under the main labour law statutes - the Employment 
Rights Act 1996 (ERA) and the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA) apply only to employees.  For this 
purpose, an employee means ‘an individual who has entered into or works under 
(or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of 
employment’ (ERA 1996, s. 230(1), and a contract of employment means ‘a 
contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is 
express) whether oral or in writing’.
2  The substantive meaning of the contract 
of employment is not made clear by statute; it has been left up to the courts to 
decide this question, applying common law tests. The four tests that have 
become best known are ‘control’, ‘integration’, ‘business reality’, and 
‘mutuality of obligation’.
3  Behind each of these tests lies a set of ‘factors’, such 
as the method of payment chosen by the parties, the length and stability of the 
employment relationship, and the degree of coverage of disciplinary and 
grievance procedures (see Table 1).  The weight that courts attach to any 
particular factor appears to be a matter of discretion, in part because lower 
courts are only subject to review if they commit errors of law in their 
identification of the relevant tests or in their application.
4   
 
Although the other three tests are still referred to and are by no means 
irrelevant, the major focus in applying the common law criteria of employee 
status since the late 1970s has been on the ‘mutuality of obligation’ test.  Where 
the existence of mutual obligations to provide work (in the case of the 
employer) and to accept any work which is offered (in the case of the worker) is 
in doubt, the relationship may be classified as one of self-employment, or   3
otherwise outside the scope of the ‘employee’ concept. These exclusionary 




7 and workers in casualised trades or occupations.
8 
 
Table 1. The relationship between factors and tests for classifying employment 
relationships 
 
Control  duty to obey orders 
discretion on hours of work 
supervision of mode of working 
Integration  disciplinary/grievance procedure 
inclusion in occupational benefit schemes 
Economic reality  method of payment 
freedom to hire others 
providing own equipment 
investing in own business 
method of payment of tax and NI 
coverage of sick pay, holiday pay 
Mutuality of obligation  duration of employment 
regularity of employment 
right to refuse work 
custom in the trade 
 
(Source: Burchell, Deakin and Honey, 1999) 
  
 
Moreover, because of the way the rules of continuity of employment operate,
9 it 
is often necessary for an individual to establish not simply that they were 
employed under a contract of employment at some point, but that the contract 
remained in force for a sufficient period of time for them to acquire the 
necessary statutory continuity.  Although the continuity rules are more 
straightforward to apply than used to be the case, following the abolition of the 
8-hour and 16-hours thresholds in the mid-1990s,
10 establishing that a contract 
of employment during periods in between separate jobs remains problematic.  
Statute itself only allows for a few exceptional periods of non-employment to be 
counted towards continuity; otherwise, a contract must be implied.   
 
For ‘zero hours contract’ workers and others whose working patterns are 
irregular or interrupted, this is a major problem.   Hence in Carmichael v. 
National Power plc,
11 the issue was whether the applicants, who worked 
periodically as tour guides at a power station, had contracts of employment   4
between ad hoc hirings; the House of Lords, restoring the ruling of the 
employment tribunal, ruled that they did not.  This meant that they could not 
claim the right to receive a written statement of particulars of employment from 
their employer, for which one month of continuous employment is required. 
 
It is not a straightforward matter in general to determine how far the parties to 
an employment relationship are free to determine the status of the supplier of 
labour.  On the one hand, the courts have said many times that they will 
disregard a ‘label’ attached to the relationship by the parties.  Hence, if other 
considerations (of the kind considered above) clearly point towards employee 
status, an agreement between the parties to the effect that the individual is self-
employed will have no legal effect. The ‘re-labelling clause’ will only carry 
much weight if other factors do not clearly point in one direction or another.
12   
 
Legislation governing waivers is also relevant here. Any agreement by the 
individual to waive his or her protective rights under ERA 1996 or TULRCA 
1992 is void.
13  On the other hand, there is an unfortunate element of circularity 
about arguments from the prohibition on waivers - the anti-waiver law is only 
effective if the individual comes under the protection of the statute, but that is 




A more intractable problem is that, for all their talk of disregarding ‘labels’, the 
courts have also reiterated that there is nothing to prevent the parties voluntarily 
accepting an arrangement which, objectively speaking, is one of self-
employment: ‘[a] man [sic] is without question free under the law to contract to 
carry out certain work for another without entering into a contract of service.   
Public policy has nothing to say either way.’
15 In principle, the form in which 
labour is contracted is a matter for the parties themselves and not for the law to 
decide.  In practice what this means is that the issue will be settled according to 
the approach taken by a particular court or tribunal towards construction of the 
contractual arrangements in question, without regard to considerations of public 
policy concerning the desirability of ensuring a clear and uniform application of 
protective legislation.   Those few cases in which the courts have said that they 
will take notice of this public policy point all concern to the interpretation of the 




2.2 Decoding ‘mutuality of obligation’ 
 
Contractual waivers and exclusions aimed at denying employee status or, in 
situations where this status is not in doubt, placing obstacles in the way of   5
employees achieving the necessary continuity of employment to qualify for 
protective rights, can only work if the courts take a particular approach towards 
the interpretation of employment agreements.  This is that contracts made 
between workers and employers are agreements made by the individual parties 
at arm’s length, and which therefore fall to be interpreted according to normal 
canons of contractual construction.  That this is the prevailing approach of the 
courts is evident from numerous decisions.  It does not take very much 
imagination to see that many of the clauses inserted into standard-form 
agreements were put there by the employer to deflect employee status.  This is 
the case, for example, with clauses that purport to grant the worker the right to 
appoint a substitute to take their place if they are unable to work (which we may 
call a ‘substitution clause’).  If read literally, this would amount to a denial not 
just of employee status (since mutuality of obligation would be lacking) but, 
going further, of the essential element of a personal commitment to provide 
labour which is also present in the contract for services. Another technique is to 
assert that the employer is under no obligation to provide work, nor for the 
employee to accept it (let us call this a ‘no mutuality clause’).  If, in practice, 
there is evidence that work is carried out continuously, and that the worker does 
not regard him- or herself as having discretion to take time off or to appoint a 
substitute whenever they feel like it, it should be open to a court to treat the 
clause as nothing more than the boilerplate which it so clearly is.   
 
But in several recent decisions, courts have taken these clauses at face value.  
The trend began with a ‘substitution clause’ in Express and Echo Publications 
Ltd. v. Tanton
17and continued with a ‘no mutuality clause’ in Stevedoring & 
Haulage Services Ltd. v. Fuller.
18  There, the employment tribunal had taken the 
view that it could look to the practice of employment in order to establish what 
the parties must have intended the terms of the contract to be.  On that basis, it 
implied an agreement between the two parties, which would have satisfied the 
mutuality test.  This approach, while admittedly heterodox from the viewpoint 
of general contractual construction, has highly respectable antecedents in 
employment law.
19  Yet the tribunal’s decision was reversed, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal ruling was that it was not possible to have regard to the 
practice or conduct of the employment relationship where the wording of the 
express contract was clear.  Behind the mutuality test, then, is the assumption 
we may refer to as consent: the courts take the view that an express agreement, 
even one which is plainly based on a standard form proffered by the employer, 
represents a consensus ad idem between the two parties. 
 
There other more or less tacit assumptions at work here.  In dealing with cases 
of casual workers, the courts are in effect using the contractual language of 
reciprocity to revive the old test of control in a new form.  As we have seen,   6
unless the worker agrees to be available for work on a continuing basis, and in 
this extended sense at the disposal of the employer, the agreement is said to lack 
the necessary mutuality of obligation.  What counts here is not reciprocity in 
exchange as such, but a particular form of mutuality under which the worker 
must cede autonomy to the employer over the timing and physical location of 
the work in order to count as an employee.  
 
Thus in the employment sphere, ‘mutuality of obligation’ does not bear its 
normal meaning in contract law.  A contract to work in return for pay will not 
lack ‘mutuality’ in the sense of the reciprocal promises needed for consideration 
as one of the elements in the formation of a contract.  However, if the judgments 
in O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte plc
20 are to be believed, such an arrangement, 
without more, will not be a contract of employment.  The mutuality of obligation 
test only looks as if it has a connection to mainstream contract law.  In truth, it is 
a test which emerged in the particular context of employment law, and which 
functions above all to exclude casual forms of work from the coverage of 
protective legislation.  Although it can be traced back to nineteenth century 
decisions on the application of master and servant law (itself a further clue as to 
its true lineage),
21 the test is not mentioned in leading twentieth century 
decisions up to the late 1970s.  Its emergence can be dated to the time
22 that 
modern employment protection legislation began to occupy a major place in the 
practice of employee relations, and when the difficulty of fitting employment 
rights into the framework of casual work was becoming a live issue. 
 
The third set of assumptions embedded in the mutuality test concerns risk.  The 
parties to an employment agreement – whether it is a contract of employment or 
a contract for services – are understood to be opting into a schema of 
protections and liabilities, with one set traded off against the other.  Thus in 
entering into a contract of employment, the employee trades off ‘subordination’ 
or acceptance of the employer’s right to give instructions and to organise the 
carrying out of the work, in return for certain protections: at a basic level, a 
regular wage which a self-employed person would not expect to receive; at a 
more extended level, the full set of income and job security rights which go with 
continuous service under the current provisions of employment protection 
legislation.  By contrast, an independent or autonomous worker employed under 
a contract for services cannot look to the employer for security of income or 
employment, but is able to take advantage of a more favourable tax and social 
security regime (in the sense that income tax is paid net of work-related 
expenses and National Insurance contributions are paid at a lower rate), as well 
as the autonomy of being able to decide when, where and how to work. 
   7
The risk perspective can be viewed either negatively or positively.  In older 
authorities under the ‘control’ test, the courts treated the trade-off involved in 
employment sceptically, regarding the implicit loss of autonomy as 
inappropriate for workers who exercised discretion over the performance of 
tasks.  Thus in Simpson v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron & Coal Co., decided in 1905 at 
the dawn of modern social protection legislation, the Court of Appeal, when 
deciding that the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 had no application in the 
case of a colliery manager who was killed in a mining accident, said of the 
legislation: 
 
It presupposes a position of dependence; it treats the class of workmen as being in 
a sense ‘inopes consilii’, and the Legislature does for them what they cannot do 
for themselves: it gives them a sort of State insurance, it being assumed that they 
are either not sufficiently intelligent or not sufficiently in funds to insure 




Almost a century later, we find the Employment Appeal Tribunal returning to 
the theme of dependence in Byrne Bros. v. Baird when attempting to determine 
the scope of the Working Time Regulations 1998, which impose maximum 
limits on weekly working hours:  
 
The reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that they are 
in a subordinate and dependent position vis-à-vis their employers: the purpose 
of the Regulations is to extend protection to workers who are, substantively and 
economically, in the same position. Thus the essence of the intended distinction 
must be between, on the one hand, workers whose degree of dependence is 
essentially the same as that of employees and, on the other, contractors who 
have a sufficiently arm’s-length and independent position to be treated as being 
able to look after themselves in the relevant respects.
24 
 
In Byrne Bros., in contrast to its predecessor of 1905, the court of 2002 took a 
functional view of the legislation that was before it, and gave a broad 
interpretation to its scope.
25  In that sense, judicial attitudes towards social 
legislation have clearly changed in the course of the past one hundred years.  
Yet the two judgments have one crucial factor in common: the idea that it is 
possible to distinguish clearly between two different groups, on the one hand 
those subject to a regime of managerial coordination in return for protection 
from the risks of employment, and on the other those whose autonomy (in either 
a personal or an economic sense) takes them outside the coverage of social 
protection.  In this respect, the contemporary tests of employment status 
continue to reflect the notion of a ‘binary divide’
26 between employment and   8
self-employment that is at the foundation of modern legislation on employment 
protection, social insurance and income taxation. 
 
2.3   Beyond mutuality? The ‘worker’ concept and the regulation of agency 
work 
 
Dissatisfaction with the mutuality test has been one of the moving forces behind 
the recent attempt to extend the scope of employment legislation through the 
use of the concept of the worker.  Under the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
section 230(3), a worker is defined as ‘an individual who has entered into or 
works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) - (a) a 
contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied 
and (if express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to 
do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract 
whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any 
profession or business carried on by the individual’.
27  Similar definitions have 
been used in the context of recent legislation on the national minimum wage
28 
and the organisation of working time.
29   
 
In Byrne Bros. v. Baird,
30 the leading case to date on the ‘worker’ definition, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal took a policy-orientated view of the statutory 
concept, holding that it was intended ‘to create an intermediate class of 
protected worker, who is on the one hand not an employee but on the other hand 
cannot in some narrower sense be regarded as carrying on a business.’  At the 
same time, the Court recognised that the ‘wording of limb (b) [that is, the 
extended ‘worker’ definition] gives no real help on what are the criteria for 
carrying on a business undertaking in sense intended by the Regulations - given 
that they cannot be the same as the criteria for distinguishing employment from 
self-employment’. The EAT then went on to say this about the distinction 
between a worker and an independent contractor falling outside the scope of 
protection altogether: 
 
Drawing that distinction in any particular case will involve all or most of the 
same considerations as arise in drawing the distinction between a contract of 
service and a contract for services - but with the boundary pushed further in the 
putative worker’s favour. It may, for example, be relevant to assess the degree 
of control exercised by the putative employer, the exclusivity of the engagement 
and its typical duration, the method of payment, what equipment the putative 
worker supplies, the level of risk undertaken, etc. The basic effect of limb (b) is, 
so to speak, to lower the pass-mark, so that cases which failed to reach the mark 
necessary to qualify for protection as employees might nevertheless do so as 
workers.   9
This is a frank acknowledgement that the test for determining ‘worker’ status 
may well not be fundamentally different from that which is applied to the 
‘employee’ – if there is a difference it is one of degree, not kind.  The outcome 
in this case, in which the court found that the applicants were ‘workers’ and 
rejected an argument that a ‘substitution clause’ in their contracts prevented this 
outcome, suggests that the introduction of the ‘worker’ concept may just tip the 
balance in certain cases.  But if the dictum just quoted is any guide, it is highly 
likely that the same assumptions of choice, control and risk which underlie the 
court’s approach to the ‘employee’ issue will continue to be relevant in the 
changed statutory context of the ‘worker’ test.   
 
Agency workers are also the focus of specific statutory intervention.  Under 
legislation regulating employment agencies and businesses, they are regarded as 
akin to employees for the purposes of tax and national insurance contributions.
31  
However, this legislation does not stipulate what their status should be for other 
purposes, including employment protection.  At common law, it is sometimes 
said that their contractual position is unique, and falls outside the normal 
classifications,
32 but this unduly neglects the possibility that they may be 
employees of either the agency or the user.  The normal approach is to regard 
them as contracted to the agency.  However, a number of decisions suggest that 
unless they are guaranteed continuous work by the agency (which is unlikely), 
they will lack mutuality of obligation and hence be employed under contracts 
for services.
33  In relation to the user, the mere presence of control, in the sense 
of managerial coordination, is not sufficient to give rise to a contract of 
employment, in the absence of additional evidence of a contractual nexus.
34  
However, both the user and the agency may be required to treat agency workers 
equally with respect to sex, race and disability discrimination.
35  In addition, 
agency workers have been brought under the scope of minimum wage and 
working time legislation by imposing the relevant obligation on either the 
agency or the user, depending firstly on which of the two of them is contracted 
to pay them and, failing that, on which one actually does pay them.
36 
 
The problem posed by agency work is that the idea of the trade-off of 
‘subordination’ for ‘security’ is undermined by the form of the contractual 
relationship: the ‘coordination’ function vests in the user while a residual ‘risk’ 
function is left with the agency.  The resulting problems of attribution of 
responsibility can be overcome only by legislative intervention, but this is 
complex in its effects, and cannot necessarily deal in advance with all the 
problems that may arise.  In truth, the attitude of the UK legislature to agency 
work is ambiguous.  It falls short of installing the kind of protective regime that 
would ensure, through a combination of independent and concurrent liabilities, 
that either the user or the agency, or both together, assume the normal   10
responsibilities of the single employer.  It fails to take this step because to do so 
would no doubt operate as a deterrent to the use of agency work in some cases.  
However, the question is whether it is legitimate to make use of the agency 
option in cases where the principal reason for doing so is simply the greater 
opportunity it offers, by comparison with direct employment, to offload risks on 
to the individual worker, rather than greater flexibility in the organisation of 
work.   
 
3.  Empirical evidence 
 
3.1 The empirical project 
 
We turn now to the findings of the empirical research. The principal objectives 
of the research carried out for the DTI were to estimate the number of 
individuals who might be affected by the wider adoption of the concept of 
‘worker’ in employment law and to identify the sources of uncertainty in the 
application of the current legal tests of employment status.  To tackle these 
research questions required a multi-method approach, involving a large, 
representative sample of individual respondents and detailed, qualitative studies 
of employment practice in a small number of cases of flexible or ‘non-standard’ 
work.   
 
The first wave of data was collected from a representative sample of 4,006 
members of the British workforce who were interviewed in January and 
February 1998.  After an initial screening to exclude those who were 
unambiguously employees or self-employed, 1,182 were asked a range of 
questions about the nature of their employment relationships.  The aim here was 
to go beyond the ‘self reporting’ method that is used to assess the number of 
employees and self-employed in the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The 
LFS relies entirely on respondents’ own perceptions of their employment status.   
In practice, as many of the cases which reach the courts only too clearly 
indicate, an individual’s own understanding of his or her status may diverge 
significantly from that of a court or tribunal.   
 
In an attempt to get round this problem, the questionnaire was drafted in such a 
way as to reproduce, through specific questions, the kind of issues which a court 
or tribunal would take into account.  Individual responses were then analysed to 
see how far respondents could be categorised as unambiguous employees or 
self-employed.  Respondents were regarded as ‘clearly employees’ if they 
defined themselves as such; were paid a salary or wage; held what they regarded 
as a permanent job; and had no non-standard working patterns (such as fixed-
term, casual or part-time work). Conversely, they were ‘clearly self-employed’   11
if they were either a director or partner in their own business, and/or employed 
others.  On this basis, 64% of all respondents were classified as clearly 
employees, and 5% were clearly self-employed.  This compares to the 86% of 
the sample that saw themselves as employees, and 13% who saw themselves as 
self-employed (a result which corresponds to that of the LFS for the same 
period).  The first result of the empirical research, then, was to show that a large 
proportion of the national labour force, 30% on this estimate, was employed 
under terms and conditions which created some degree of uncertainty over their 
employment status. 
 
The next step was to try to arrive at an estimate of how many individuals could 
be classified as ‘workers’ under the extended definition of that concept.  For this 
purpose, the analysis focused on the group of individuals that would remain 
outside the ‘worker’ definition, that is to say, the ‘independent self-employed’.  
These were identified as those respondents who had worked for more than one 
employer in the six months prior to the questionnaire, and who ‘passed’ the tests 
of ‘economic reality’ for autonomous work: in other words, they were able to 
sub-contract, they were not paid a wage or salary, they paid their own income 
tax and national insurance contributions, and they were not entitled to receive 
either sick pay or paid holidays. This group constituted 8% of the total sample, 
leaving a figure of 92% of the labour force as ‘workers’.  But, of this 92%, 
many would be affected by uncertainty as to their status because they, in turn, 
would only ‘fail’ perhaps one or two of the economic reality tests.  When this 
factor was taken into account, the proportion of the total labour force that could 
be classified as clearly in the ‘worker’ category fell to only 80%.
37   
 
The message coming out of the quantitative phase of the study is therefore the 
following: whichever concept is used, ‘employee’ or ‘worker’, the nature of 
modern employment relations is such that there will inevitably be a large group 
of individuals whose employment status is in an unclear ‘grey zone’ between 
employment and self-employment.  The ‘worker’ concept, in so far as it can be 
assumed to map reasonably closely on to the test of ‘economic reality’, reduces 
the size of the ‘grey zone’ but does not eliminate it. 
 
The second wave of data collection involved re-visiting a small proportion of 
that part of the sample whose employment status was uncertain or ambiguous in 
order to gather more in-depth information in less structured discussions, and to 
analyse their written contracts of employment or terms and conditions of 
employment.  These qualitative case studies were based on a combination of 
focus groups and individual semi-structured interviews, involving altogether 36 
respondents.  The interviews were carried out in the spring and summer of 1998.    12
Documentary evidence, including individuals’ contracts of employment and 
written statements of terms and conditions, was also obtained. 
 
A full analysis of all the cases of uncertain employment status in the qualitative 
wave of the research has been carried out elsewhere.
38  What follows is an 
analysis of how the issues of choice, control and risk were viewed by those who 
were interviewed. 
 
3.2 Choice: the use of standard form contracts to deflect employee status 
 
The case studies provide abundant examples of employers using standard-term 
employment agreements as devices to insert terms that have the effect of 
altering employment status.  Thus it was common to find contracts entered into 
by agency workers with their agency containing both a ‘re-labelling’ clause and 
a ‘no mutuality clause’.   In one case, the re-labelling clause stated that,  
 
‘for the avoidance of doubt, these terms shall not give rise to a contract of 
employment... and therefore the [worker] will not have the statutory rights 
accorded to employees’.   
 
This was unlikely to have negatived employee status since it simply represented 
the view of one of the parties as to the agreement’s legal effect.  The ‘no 
mutuality’ term stated:  
 
‘The [worker] acknowledges that it is the nature of temporary work that there 
may be periods when no suitable work is available and agrees (a) that suitability 
shall be determined solely by the [agency and user] and (b) that the [agency and 
user] shall incur no liability towards the [worker] should they fail to offer 
opportunities to work...’   
 
This term stands a much greater chance of excluding employee status, so long 
as the court takes it at face value, and does not permit evidence of any contrary 
practice of regular work to be set up against it. 
  
In another case, several specimen contracts with agencies were obtained.  The 
specimen contracts all contained clauses that appeared to be aiming at the 
exclusion of employee status by a variety of means.  One was to deny that the 
arrangement constituted a legally binding contract of employment between the 
worker and either the agency or the user (instead the arrangement was stated to 
be a contract for services); another was to stipulate that the worker was not 
required to accept any assignment, nor was the agency required to find an 
assignment for the worker (the mutuality of obligation point). Similar   13
techniques can be seen in the contractual documentation analysed by the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in the Pertemps case.
39  In that case, the EAT 
considered that the terms of the formal written contract were an important 
indicator that the agency worker concerned was not an employee. 
 
The contractual documents of agency workers also indicated that once each 
assignment was accepted by the worker, the worker came under a number of 
stated obligations, for example to cooperate with the user’s staff and to follow 
the work rules of the user.  There are dicta to suggest that making such 
obligations explicit could be seen as evidence that the relationship with the 
agency was not based on a contract of employment, for the very reason that 
such obligations are normally implied into such a contract; if the worker were 
truly an employee, it may be argued, there would be no need to spell them out.
40  
An alternative view is that there is nothing to prevent an employer (or any other 
party) seeking to make explicit what would otherwise be implicit.  On this basis 
it could be said that spelling out the obligations of obedience and care does not 
help to settle the issue of status either way.
41 In the present, confused state of the 
law, however, it is not surprising that employers seek to take advantage of 
judicial dicta which open the way to a finding that the worker is self-employed. 
 
In another case, the respondent worked as a freelance copy-editor for a 
publishing house.  Under a highly detailed and lengthy contract issued by the 
publishing house, a clear distinction was drawn between ‘freelances’ and 
‘employees’: the documentation referred to the importance of this distinction 
from the point of view of complying with Inland Revenue and Contributions 
Agency rules on tax and national insurance contributions.  The documentation 
spelt out the employer’s  view that the distinction between freelances and 
employees was part of what made freelance work attractive to both sides, and 
specified reasons for the view that the respondent was not employed as its 
employee: as a freelance she would not normally work on the employer’s 
premises; she controlled when the work was done, within agreed completion 
dates; the contractual relationship between the employer and the respondent 
only began when an order was placed and ended when the employer paid for the 
completed work; the respondent did not have an email, telephone number or 
desk at the employer’s place of work; and she was paid only on presentation of 
an invoice for work done.  The respondent’s account of her working 
relationship, given during her interview, suggests that she was uncertain as to its 
effects.  When asked whether the employer had a duty to provide her with work 
she replied ‘absolutely’, suggesting that she saw herself as having what a lawyer 
would refer to as ‘mutuality of obligation’.  However, on the basis of her 
agreement, she concluded that she did not have a continuing or ‘global’ 
contractual relationship with the employer.  She also stated in her initial survey   14
interview that she could if necessary hire others to work with her, which would 
count in favour of her being independently self-employed.  
 
Overall, the case studies suggest that employers make frequent use of 
standard-form contractual documentation that is drafted with the case-law on 
employee status in mind.  These documents are meant to shield employers from 
legal liability by providing evidence that can rebut a claim of employee status.  
This type of documentation is also used as a signal to workers that they have 
self-employed status.  The contents of documents may bear little relationship to 
the  practice of a particular employment relationship; indeed, they may 
contradict it.   There is very little evidence that either employers or employees 
see this type of documentation in the way that it is viewed by the courts, namely 
as embodying a contractual consensus ad idem. 
 
3.3 Control: perceptions of managerial power  
 
The juridical divide between employment and self-employment is founded on 
an assumption that employees are subject to a degree of managerial 
coordination or control that does not apply to independent contractors.   
However, the case studies suggest that, in practice, perceptions of control and 
accountability are much more complex than a simple division between 
employment and self-employment would imply.  Self-employed respondents 
commented that they came under pressure to accept work from particular clients 
and had to operate to very tight deadlines.  Similarly, respondents employed on 
zero-hours or on-call contracts saw themselves as being required to respond to 
the employer’s demands, even if their contracts suggested that they had the right 
to turn down work offered to them. A freelance who had no formal commitment 
to a regular client, and had no formal contractual expectation of receiving 
continuous work, commented that in practice it was often difficult to refuse 
work: 
  
  ‘So what you’re basically saying is you are free to decide when you work and 
for whom or are you free to decide when you work? Well, I’m free in as much 
as I’m not free - well, to be honest, no - I’m free to decide when I work, I’m not 
free to decide who I work for at the moment because I have to take whatever I 
can get.  I always pretty much have had to take whatever I can get.  So I’m not 
free to decide who I work for.’   
 
In turn, very long hours, unsocial hours working and variability of working 
hours were problems both for employees and for the self-employed.  For certain 
employees, including managerial and professional workers, hours were 
perceived as being flexible in the employer’s favour.  A charity manager said   15
that while her contracted hours were 37 a week, she normally worked 60 or 
more hours, with adverse consequences for her health:  
 
‘Yes, its 37 hours in theory, and flexible.  If I do evenings and weekends, in 
theory I have time off in lieu.  One of the reasons I am not well now is that I 
have been overdoing it over 2 years and I look around the voluntary sector and 
see a lot of people under stress and getting ill because they are trying so hard to 
make ends meet and do the job with limited resources and be everything to 
everybody and fulfil bottomless demands – so you end up doing excess hours.’  
 
Some agency workers considered that their status was a flexible one, which 
gave them the option of refusing work.  However, there were also cases in 
which respondents employed through agencies worked for long periods 
alongside permanent staff doing very much the same work.  Here, there was no 
sense in which agency employment gave the worker greater ‘control’ over his 
own working arrangements:     
 
‘Do you look upon yourself as being basically your own boss, so that you can 
decide whether you want to stay with them or not? No, I wouldn’t say my own 
boss because you know you are working for a firm – if it wasn’t them, it would 
be another agency.  Would you rather have a job with a firm or are you quite 
happy working for an agency? I would prefer a permanent job, yes, if [the 
client] said OK we’ll take you on permanently, I would say yes. What would the 
advantages be?  There would be a more stable sort of environment and you 
would also have a pension scheme and … the benefits that go with [being with] 
a company…’  
 
In short, the predominant view among those interviewed was that under 
non-standard working arrangements, control over when and how work was done 
very often vested with the employer or client, regardless of the legal form of the 
relationship in question. 
 
3.4  Risk: the flexibility-security ‘trade off’ and the experience of 
non-standard work 
 
As we have seen, the approach of the courts is based on the assumption that 
individuals trade off security for autonomy and flexibility when opting for 
non-standard work or self-employment in place of employment as employee.  
This found an echo in the comments made by some respondents.  Some 
explicitly identified with the idea of a ‘trade off’ between the stability and 
security of employee status, on the one hand, and the greater autonomy of 
self-employment.  Freelance workers and the self-employed contrasted the   16
‘control’ to which they had had to submit when they were employees, with the 
greater freedom but also the responsibility which being self-employed entailed: 
 
    ‘The advantages of being employed over self-employed are obvious in that 
you’ve got a regular income coming in and the buck doesn’t stop with you!  
Although I’ve always had fairly senior positions, there was always somebody 
who I could offload on to, if you like.  And so there were advantages in that.  I 
was made redundant once when the company closed down… it was completely 
out of my hands and I don’t like that.  I like to be in control, so the advantage of 
being self-employed there - I was in control.  And of course, I’ve worked for 
large companies and small companies’ (child minder). 
 
  ‘The only good thing about working for an employer is that you don’t take any 
of the strain, you start work at 8.30 and you finish at 5.30 - you don’t have to 
worry about what happens overnight.  Here, I sort of think “Oh, you know, 
who’s got the keys to the next venue”, because we swap around, and like today, 
I was worried about [an employee] because she was very quiet this morning and 
I thought “Oh, I’ve upset her”’ (health promotion worker).   
 
The downside of being self-employed was, according to one respondent, ‘being 
poor’ but the advantages included: ‘you do the job and as long as you’re doing 
the job, people don’t worry about what you’re doing at that precise moment 
they walk past your desk’.   
 
Freelance workers appeared to value the autonomy to arrange a pattern of 
working which suited their needs:  
 
‘I find that I have developed a way of working, over a series of fifty or so 
contracts, that I feel very happy with.  I wasn’t given guidance, but I didn’t find 
that a problem.. I could work out the best way to do things and interact with the 
office...I don’t even have to tell them [clients] really.  I just take the product that 
they give me, and then return it to them and hopefully that’s what is required, 
and then I’m done’ (freelance editor). 
 
‘I like the fact that I’m my own boss.  To a certain extent, you set your own 
hours because if people come and they want you to start at 6 in the morning if 
they’re nurses or they do shift work, you can always say no, you don’t work 
those hours.  It’s nice to be at home in the summer.  It’s nice to call the tune, 
basically’ (child minder).   
 
At the same time, the case studies suggest that choice is conditioned by factors 
which include the need to fit in with family arrangements; the cost of retraining   17
following time spent out of full-time work; the time and complexity of setting 
up a business; discrimination against older workers; and the unavailability of 
regular work.  The need to fit working hours around childcare requirements was 
one of the principal factors which motivated those who had taken up 
childminding: 
 
‘I had a good job once!  I started doing this when I had my own children, you 
see, and it’s difficult when you’ve got children.  I didn’t want to put mine with a 
childminder, so you incorporate an extra one into the home and when your 
children are at school, you need a job that will put you here when they’re here 
and in school holidays.’  
 
Age discrimination was also cited as a factor in the context of a return to 
full-time employment after a break for child-rearing.  The difficulty of getting a 
regular job made agency work attractive for one individual in this position: 
 
‘Initially I did hope to get another permanent job, either full-time or part-time, 
but I knew my age was against me.  I really think equal opportunities is a name 
only .... that’s with age, disablement. Yes, they’ll call you for an interview 
because there are equal opportunities.  But you know full well that you are not 
going to get it.  So I am quite content with now, the way I am working and 
making a life for myself and paid of course’ (agency worker).   
 
This respondent was in her late 50s and had returned to work after a break of 
almost 20 years raising her children.  She was also registered as disabled. 
 
In addition, many respondents saw non-standard work as inferior to regular 
working arrangements.  Agency workers and fixed-term contract workers, in 
some cases, took these forms of work because permanent work was not made 
available to them.  One respondent had been dismissed by his employer and 
re-employed on a self-employed basis.  Once this happened he decided to set up 
his own business but had not previously considered doing so. 
 
Moreover, on the balance of evidence of the interviews there was no 
straightforward division between the perceptions of employees, who might have 
been expected to have feelings of security, and those of the self-employed, who 
might have been expected to accept insecurity in return for the prospect of 
greater reward. Many employees had concerns about the inherently insecure 
nature of their jobs, concerns that were largely outside their control. This was 
particularly the case with fixed-term contract workers.  A manager of a charity 
commented on:  
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‘the anxiety and insecurity of it all and I can keep telling myself, well, in the 
commercial sector this is the fact of life, if you don’t sell what you do, you 
don’t survive… We have to sell what we are doing to fund us and if we don’t do 
that successfully then we don’t deserve to carry on’.   
 
A hospital doctor employed on a fixed-term contract as part of his training 
referred to a growing lack of security of employment:  
 
‘medicine’s always been looked on as having a lot of job security, but I think as 
things are changing and the market environment’s creeping in then that really is 
going’.   
 
This respondent had a three-year contract, about which he said: 
 
‘It gives you a bit of stability but even three years isn’t that long and after that I 
may not be able to get a job at all.  It’s not common in medicine but it does 
happen’.  
 
A further problem associated with employment on a series of fixed-term 
contracts was lack of clarity of the legal position.
42   A clerical worker in the 
public sector told us: 
 
‘I was a bit concerned but I didn’t want to mention it because I didn’t know 
whether at the time my boss knew about the two year rule and I thought well, if 
he keeps me on longer, I’ll keep quiet!  But he knew - he obviously knew about 
it - because I saw a note from him asking the admin person there - when is [X’s] 
second anniversary, you know.’   
 
Agency workers, likewise, had concerns with insecurity and also with 
difficulties of working alongside permanent staff who were paid more than they 
were: 
 
‘Those sorts of people - the ones that don’t like agency workers - have they 
indicated why they don’t like them?’  ‘I think it was because they felt threatened 
first of all, because they were actually training us to do what they were doing 
and human nature being what it is, you’re going to think - I’m going to train 
these, they’re paying them less than me, I’m going to be out!  I think once they 
have had redundancies but it was voluntary and the people who wanted to go 
went.  The other people are still there.  And I think over the time of being there, 
their fears gradually eased off.’   
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For some agency workers, difficult relations with the permanent staff were 
tempered by the feeling ‘if you weren’t doing this, you could be on the dole’.  
Even then, there was the possibility that the employment relationship could be 
brought to an end at very short notice; the same respondent described how:  
 
‘one Monday morning we were working in the city centre and as we went in 
there were two of our [agency] supervisors there and they had a list and saw 
who was coming in… They were just literally stopping people at the door, 
sending them over, and I think in one go they got rid of about 150 people that 
morning.’ 
 
Respondents on both sides of the employee/self-employed divide expressed 
concerns about health and safety.  An agency worker reported difficulty in 
obtaining compensation after suffering an injury at work for which neither the 
agency nor the user would take responsibility.  A self-employed construction 
worker commented on the high health and safety risks facing subcontractors on 
building sites: 
 
   ‘… a lot of companies do this now.  They put a scaffold up for brickwork or for 
people to put the roof on and then you want to go on the scaffolding after to put 
the window in, as soon as they’ve finished the roof… because they’ve put the 
scaffolding up for the roofers, they’ve put a sign on it saying “not suitable for 
anything else”.  So if you go on after them and you fall off that scaffolding, it 
clears them of liability for your injuries.  Which is common practice now.’  
 
A majority of the respondents also associated the work they were doing with the 
absence of long-term financial security.  Several agency workers, casual and 
zero-hours contract workers, fixed-term contract workers and self-employed 
construction workers had no access to an employer’s pension scheme and had 
made no provision for themselves. In turn, the downside of being an employee, 
however, was not simply a degree of inflexibility over working arrangements, 
but also, in many cases, the lack of any compensating security: 
 
 ‘As an employee you have set times and you are tied down to that job and in all 
honesty employers mess you about, because they know that if they were to get 
rid of you within a matter of days they could get someone else doing the same 
job.  So they don’t care for the worker like they should because they know there 
is someone there to replace them and that is one of the reasons why I set up on 
my own.  I used to always get laid off at Christmas time.’ (self-employed 
construction worker) 
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In short, the qualitative wave provided rich evidence on individuals’ reasons for 
choosing particular forms of work and their perceptions of flexibility and 
autonomy, on the one hand, and of insecurity and risk, on the other. Some 
respondents saw the advantages and disadvantages of particular forms of work 
in terms of trade-offs between flexibility and security, suggesting that they 
exercised a degree of choice in weighing up which form of work to adopt.  In 
numerous cases, however, the choice of non-standard work was seen as 
influenced and constrained by external pressures, the most important of which 
were family commitments, retraining costs, age and disability discrimination, 
and the lack of availability of alternative work.   In particular, for those with 
family obligations, it was a matter of necessity to find employment that offered 
them the opportunity to arrange their work around domestic commitments.   
Those returning to employment after a period of unemployment or after family 
commitments chose non-standard work because of the costs of acquiring or 
re-acquiring skills of the kind needed for a more stable and permanent position.   
There was a perception that it was easier for older workers to get employment 
with an agency than with an employer looking for a longer-term commitment.    
 
Although many respondents clearly identified particular advantages and 
disadvantages with the form of work in which they were engaged, there was a 
blurring of the division between standard and non-standard work, and between 
employment and self-employment.  Hence self-employment could result in a 
considerable restriction of personal autonomy in practice and to long and 
intense working hours, thanks to the need to meet tight deadlines and maintain 
reputation with clients. Employees in non-standard employment, conversely, 
commented on growing insecurity and stress caused by uncertainty over their 
future job prospects.   
 
Both employees and the self-employed reported being affected in different ways 
by financial insecurity.  Agency workers and the self-employed often had no 
access to pension schemes, and this was also a problem for employees working 
on fixed-term or task contracts. Many of the social and economic risks for 
which employment legislation makes provision were perceived as being 
common to both employment and self-employment; these include low pay, 
insecurity of work, health and safety risks and absence of long-term financial 
security. 
 
4. Conclusion: aligning employment law with employment practice 
 
Evidence of individuals’ experience of non-standard work suggests that the 
legal division between employment and self-employment does not correspond 
to social perceptions of a clear divide between these different forms of work.  In   21
the context of these forms of non-standard work, then, the notions of choice, 
control, and risk that underlie the approach of the courts are significantly out of 
synch with the way employment relationships are viewed on the ground.  This 
does not mean that the approach of the courts is, in itself, illegitimate.  The tests 
used by the courts are the product of a long process of emergence that is largely 
internal to legal doctrine.
43   It does however suggest that employment law, at a 
social and economic level, is currently operating dysfunctionally. 
 
One possible solution, which the legislature has adopted in recent years, is, as 
we have seen, to alter the basic definitional test for dependent labour, by 
substituting ‘worker’ for ‘employee’.  Whether this will be successful remains 
to be seen; as yet, there are too few decided cases for the issue to be clear.  
There is a danger that the same assumptions that shape judicial attitudes to the 
employment contract will simply re-emerge in a new form.  Thus there may be 
certain types of work relationship that the courts will be reluctant to interpret as 
giving rise to protected status, whatever word is used to describe that status.  If, 
however, the courts are prepared to use the criterion of ‘economic reality’ to 
shape the ‘worker’ concept, the empirical evidence obtained from the 
quantitative wave of the DTI study suggests that significantly fewer of those 
who currently think of themselves as ‘employees’ would be affected by 
uncertainty over their legal status.  This would mark a significant change. 
 
The main obstacle to aligning the courts’ interpretation of employment contracts 
with those of the parties themselves is the rigid and artificial ‘mutuality of 
obligation’ test.  Under these circumstances, progress in making employment 
law less dysfunctional depends upon the courts changing their approach to the 
construction of contractual documents and working arrangements.   A first step 
(but only the first) would be to cease taking standard-form employment 
agreements at face value, and to consider applying to them the same kind of 
sceptical scrutiny that is applied to similar agreements in the consumer sphere.  
The courts cannot apply directly to employment contracts the provisions of the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, nor does it seem that the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 will be of much use in the employment 
sphere.
44  But it is open to employment tribunals, as a matter of contractual 
construction, to have regard to the practice of employment as a guide to 
interpreting the terms of express agreements.  It is surprising that they do not 
take this route more often, given recent dicta in the House of Lords encouraging 
them to do so.
45 
 
Certain legislative changes might assist the courts and employment tribunals in 
arriving at a more effective approach to construction.  In the context of the 
employer-employee relationship, the effect of the written statement law in   22
section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is that documentation issued by 
the employer is not regarded as a definitive account of the contract; it is only the 
employer’s view of the contract terms, and can be contradicted by other 
potential sources of the contract including collective agreements and custom 
and practice.
46  Thus section 1 is the functional equivalent, in employment law, 
of the principle, in consumer law, of judicial control of standard-form 
agreements.  Section 1, however, has no effect if the document in question is 
interpreted as giving rise to a relationship of self-employment.  It makes no 
sense to allow the courts to intervene once the nature of the employment has 
been established, but to give the employer a more or less free rein to determine 
the legal status of the relationship in the first place.  Thus there is a clear case 
for extending the courts’ power to review and regulate standard-form 
employment agreements to include control over documents that purport, directly 
or indirectly, to determine employee status. 
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